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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND GUNS
[A1ll too often, the difference between a battered woman and a dead woman
is the presence of a gun.
-Senator Frank Lautenberg.'
INTRODUCTION
When a woman is a victim of physical violence in the United
States, more likely than not the perpetrator is someone she knows; 2
approximately twenty-eight percent of the perpetrators are either hus-
bands or boyfriends of the female victims.3 As a result, more women
are injured by domestic violence than by car accidents, muggings, and
stranger rapes combined. 4 An incidence of domestic violence occurs
every fifteen seconds-more frequently than any other crime in the
country.5 Over 572,000 women experience violence at the hands of
their intimates every year.6
In addition to these staggering statistical data, domestic violence
has several unique characteristics that differentiate it from other
forms of criminal assault. They include underreporting and high
rates of recidivism. While only three percent of stranger attacks go
unreported, conservative estimates indicate that eighteen percent of
all domestic violence incidents are not reported because of victims'
fear that the perpetrator will retaliate. 7 This fear of repeat violence is
not unfounded; a domestic assault victim is three times more likely
than a victim of stranger assault to suffer from a repeat assault within a
six-month period.8 According to the Department ofJustice's National
1 142 CONG. REc. S11,227 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg)
(quoting Senator Wellstone's earlier remark).
2 See RoNET BACHMAN, U.S. DEP'T oFJUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WoMEN: A NATIONAL
CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT 1 (1994) ("Over two-thirds of violent victimizations
against women were committed by someone known to them .... ."). In contrast, the report
establishes that only five percent of all male victimizations were perpetrated by intimates or
relatives. See id.
3 Seeid,
4 See Evan Stark & Anne Flitcraft, Violence Among Intimates: An Epidemiological Review,
in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 293, 301 (Vincent B. Van Hasselt et al. eds., 1988); see
also David M. Fine, Note, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: The Proper Federal Role in
Policing Domestic Violence 84 CORNELL L. REv. 252, 256 & n.19 (1998) (citing Stark & Flit-
craft, supra).
5 See STATE OF N.Y. OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DATA SHEET
1 (1995) [hereinafter N.Y. DATA SHEET] (citing 1987 FBI statistics).
6 See BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: VIO-
LENCE BETWEEN INTIMATrFs 2 (1994) [hereinafter BJS FINDINGS]. This may be a conservative
estimate. One source puts the number at approximately two million women per year. See
142 CONG. REC. S10,380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). Yet an-
other source puts the number nearly four million women each year. See Fine, supra note 4,
at 256.
7 See BACHmAN, supra note 2, at 1.
8 See N.Y. DATA SHEET, supra note 5, at 2 (citing 1986 Bureau of Justice Statistics
data).
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Crime Victimization survey, approximately one in five victims of do-
mestic abuse report three or more similar assaults within that six-
month period.9
Victimizations by intimates are often more violent and cause
more severe injury than attacks by strangers. For example, victims of
domestic violence are almost twice as likely to be seriously injured and
more likely to require medical care than are victims of stranger vio-
lence. 10 Furthermore, domestic battery injuries account for twenty-
two to thirty-five percent of women seeking hospital emergency care."
Recidivism is a prevalent factor: domestic violence is almost always
characterized by a pattern of abusive conduct that continually esca-
lates in both frequency and severity.' 2
When weapons enter into the equation of violence, the result is
often lethal. Of all the women murdered in the United States in a
given year, approximately thirty percent lose their lives to husbands or
boyfriends.' 3 In 1992, 1432 women were murdered by their inti-
mates.14 Sixty-two percent of these murder victims were killed by a
gun.15 Considering these domestic violence data, one researcher con-
cluded that the "availability of guns in the home greatly increases the
likelihood that domestic disputes and quarrels will end up in killings if
there has been a history of nonlethal violence."' 6
In response to this epidemic of domestic violence, the call for
both awareness and legislative proposals aimed at combating such vio-
lence have increased in the past thirty years. 17 Although at first action
9 See BJS FINDINGS, supra note 6, at 2.
10 See BACHMAN, supra note 2, at 1 (stating that 59% of women victimized by their
intimates were seriously injured compared with 27% of women victimized by strangers, and
that 27% of injured women attacked by intimates required medical care, while only 14% of
those attacked by strangers did).
11 See N.Y. DATA SHEET, supra note 5, at 2 (citing the American Medical Association's
Diagnostic and Treatment Guidelines on Domestic Violence).
12 See Amend Section 658 of the Fiscal Year 1997 Omnibus Appropriation Act; Gun Ban for
Individuals Convicted of a Misdemeanor Crime of Domestic Violence: Hearings on H.R 26 and H.R
445 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997)
[hereinafter Hearings on HI. 26 and H.R 445] ("Those who are separated or divorced
from their [abusive] partners suffer dramatically increased rates of violence.").
13 See N.Y. DATA SHEET, supra note 5, at 2 (citing 1990 FBI statistics).
14 See BJS FINDINGS, supra note 6, at 2 (citing the FBI's Crime in the U.S.). However,
another source gives a significantly higher estimate. See 142 CONG. REc. S10,380 (daily ed.
Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (stating that every year approximately 6000
women die as a result of domestic violence).
15 See N.Y. DATA SHEET, supra note 5, at 1 (citing 1995 Bureau of Justice Statistics
data).
16 Peter Wetzels, Family Violence in the United States and Abroad, 15 N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 223, 224 (1995) (contribution to a multiauthor symposium).
17 See, e.g., George B. Stevenson, Federal Antiviolence and Abuse Legislation: Toward Elimi-
nation of DisparateJusticefor Women and Children, 33 Wiu.Em L. Rxv. 847, 848-57 (1997)
(surveying the federal legislative response to domestic violence and documenting the his-
torical setting in which this response took place).
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was taken primarily at the state and local level, the federal govern-
ment has recently issued new antidomestic violence initiatives.18 In
particular, Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act of 1994
(VAWA) 19 as a part of a massive anti-crime bill.20 The VAWA commits
a substantial amount of federal funds and attention to "the criminal
justice system's response to violence against women."21
Despite ever increasing intervention, the availability of civil pro-
tection orders, and better tracking of offenders, assailants charged
with misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence (punishable by a fine
or less than a year in prison) were neither required to relinquish their
personal firearms nor prohibited from obtaining weapons.22 Thus,
documented abusers were able to retain the tools by which they
threatened and carried out serious acts of violence against their inti-
mates. In contrast, perpetrators of nondomestic violence, who are
more readily charged and convicted of felonies (punishable by a year
or more in prison), lost their right to possess firearms under federal
gun-control laws.23 Only recently have state and federal legislators be-
gun to fill in this gap.
Changes at the state level have come in one of two forms. States
have adopted weapons-banning provisions within their domestic vio-
lence statutes24 or disqualification provisions for domestic violence of-
fenders within their firearm statutes. 25 Many of these statutes require
a current restraining order to prevent an individual from owning or
possessing a firearm.26
18 See Fine, supra note 4, at 253-57.
19 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
18 & 42 U.S.C.).
20 See Fine, supra note 4, at 259.
21 Stevenson, supra note 17, at 856.
22 See BarbaraJ. Hart, Firearms and Protection Order Enforcement: Implications for
Full Faith and Credit and Federal Criminal Prosecutions 1 (Oct. 15, 1996) (unpublished
notes and outline of the presentation to the National College of District Attorneys, on file
with author).
23 Cf Hearings on H.R 26 and H.R 445, supra note 12 (written testimony of Rita
Smith, Executive Director, National Coalition Against Domestic Violence), available in
1997 WL 8219766 ("In most states, domestic violence is considered largely a misdemeanor
offense, although the injuries to all battered women are at least as serious as those incurred
in 90% of all violent crimes classified as felonies.").
24 Fourteen states have such domestic violence statutes that specifically restrict gun
ownership by perpetrators of domestic violence. See infra notes 69-77.
25 These are gun control statutes that identify individuals who are not permitted to
possess or transfer firearms. For a full discussion of the distinctions between these various
kinds of state statutes, see infra Part IA.
26 See Hart, supra note 22, at 1-4 (stating that "recent developments in protection or-
der enforcement reflect the emerging view that domestic batterers should be dispossessed
of and denied access to firearms" and listing various state statutes requiring civil protection
orders for dispossession).
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In an attempt to federalize this effort, Congress passed two ex-
pansions of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA) 27 First, in
1994 Congress amended the GCA to prevent individuals subject to
court protective orders from receiving firearms. 28 Despite this amend-
ment, many perpetrators of domestic violence escaped the expanded
GCA provision and continue to buy and own guns.29 This gap moti-
vated the second expansion of the GCA.
New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg led this second push by
introducing a bill to further amend the GCA.30 The Lautenberg
Amendment, which passed overwhelmingly 3' as part of a major fed-
eral spending bill, extends the original GCA by criminalizing firearm
possession not only for perpetrators of felonies but also for perpetra-
tors of domestic violence misdemeanors.3 2 Senator Lautenberg com-
mented in 1996 that his bill "stands for the simple proposition that if
you beat your wife... you should not have a gun."33
Despite its potential for effective protection of domestic violence
victims and the strong endorsement by Congress, the Lautenberg
Amendment has faced a barrage of legislative 34 and federal court chal-
lenges.3 5 In particular, members of the police and the military have
27 Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 &
26 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the GCA and its 1994 amendment, see infra Part I.B.1-2.
28 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (8), (g) (8) (1994). However, law enforcement officers are
still exempt from the firearm prohibitions by the 1994 amendment, as they were under the
original GCA. See id. § 925(a) (1).
29 See 142 CONG. REc. S10,379 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Wellstone).
30 S. 1632, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted).
31 The Lautenberg Amendment passed by a vote of 97 to 2 on September 12, 1996.
See 142 CONG. REc. S10,380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996). Interestingly, the two Senators who
voted against the amendment, Howell Heflin of Alabama and Jeff Bingaman of New Mex-
ico, were both Democrats. See Political Ad Watch, IDAHo STATESMAN, Apr. 9, 1998, at lB,
available in 1998 WL 11223287.
32 See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009-371, 3009-371 to -372 (1996). The
Lautenberg Amendment amended the following provisions of the GCA in 18 U.S.C.:
§ 921 (a) (defining domestic violence misdemeanor); § 922(d) (prohibiting the sale or dis-
posal of firearms to anyone convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor); § 922(g)
(prohibiting anyone convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor from possessing or
transporting firearms); § 922(s) (3) (B) (i) (requiring licensed dealers to get a buyer's state-
ment that the buyer has not been convicted of and is not under indictment for a domestic
violence misdemeanor); § 925(a) (1) (excluding 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (9) and (g) (9) from
the public interest exception to the GCA). For a discussion of the changes brought on by
the Lautenberg Amendment and the removal of the public interest exception, see infra
Part I.B.3.
33 142 CONG. Rac. S9458 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
34 See H.R. 445, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced by Rep. Stupak) (proposing to apply
the public interest exception to misdemeanor convictions); H.R. 26, 105th Cong. (1997)
(introduced by Rep. Barr) (proposing to apply the Lautenberg Amendment only
prospectively).
35 See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp. 2d 811, 828-29 (S.D. Ind. 1998)
(dismissing the equal protection claim against the Lautenberg Amendment after it failed
rational basis review standard), affd, 185 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1999); Fraternal Order of
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severely criticized the Lautenberg Amendment.3 6 This Note centers
on one such criticism: while previous federal gun control legislation
created a special exemption-the so-called public interest excep-
tion-for governmental agencies, including the police and the mili-
tary,37  the Lautenberg Amendment specifically precludes this
exception from applying to domestic violence misdemeanor convic-
tions.38 In other words, the Lautenberg Amendment does not exempt
the police and the military, while all other federal gun control statutes
do. This arguably creates a felon-misdemeanant anomaly: police and
military personnel with felony convictions of any kind are permitted,
via the GCA public interest exception, to possess weapons, while
under the Lautenberg Amendment those with domestic violence mis-
demeanor convictions are not.
Because of the lack of a public interest exception for domestic
violence misdemeanants, members of the police force and police or-
ganizations have sought to overturn the Lautenberg Amendment.
Numerous legal challenges against the Lautenberg Amendment have
been based on the claim that the Amendment exceeds Congress's
Commerce Clause power,3 9 that it violates the Second,40 Fifth,41 and
Tenth42 Amendments, that it is an ex post facto law,43 and that it is an
unlawful bill of attainder.44 To date, all of these challenges have ulti-
mately failed. This result suggests unanimity among the circuits; how-
ever, one particular constitutional challenge against the Lautenberg
Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.D.G. 1997) (granting summaryjudgment in
favor of government in police association's challenge against the Lautenberg's Amend-
ment), rev'd, 152 F.3d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that the Lautenberg Amendment
violates the Equal Protection Clause and applying the public interest exception to police
officers convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors as remedy), reh'g granted, 159 F.d
1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiain), affid on reh'g, 173 F.3d 898, 905-08 (D.C. Cir.) (af-
firming the district court's holding and holding that the amendment does not violate the
Fifth Amendment, the Second Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, or the Commerce
Clause); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1997),
affld sub. nom., Hileyv. Barrett, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998) (upholding the constitution-
ality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (9)). For a full discussion of these cases and the equal protec-
tion arguments involved, see infra Parts II.B, IIA.
36 See John Fales, Domestic-Vriolence Amendment Causes Problems in the Military, WASH.
Timrs, Aug. 10, 1998, at A10; Jonathan Kerr, Critics Say Anti-Domestic Violence Amendment
Takes Shot at Police WESr's LEGAL Navs, Dec. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 684742; Roberto
Suro & Philip P. Pan, Law's Omission Disarms Some Police: Domestic Violence Act Has Some Of-
ficers Hanging Up Their Guns, WASH. Posr, Dec. 27, 1996, at A16.
37 See 18 U.S.C. § 925(a) (1) (1994).
38 See id. (as amended 1996).
39 See, e.g., Barret 968 F. Supp. at 1572.
40 See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police 152 F.3d at 1002.
41 See, e.g., id.
42 See, e.g., Barret 968 F. Supp. at 1577-78.
43 See, e.g., id. at 1575-76.
44 See, e.g., id. at 1576-77.
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Amendment-that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment-has proven particularly troublesome.
In Fraternal Order of Police v. United States ("FOP 1'),45 the District
of Columbia Circuit originally held that certain provisions of the 1996
Lautenberg Amendment violate the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause by irrationally treating domestic violence misdemeanants
worse than domestic violence felons.46 As a remedy, the court held
that § 925, the provision of the Lautenberg Amendment that explic-
itly prohibits the public interest exception from applying to domestic
violence misdemeanor convictions, is unconstitutional. 47 Subse-
quently, the District of Columbia Circuit vacated this decision,
granted rehearing, and reversed ("FOP H').48 The court ultimately
held with some reservation that despite the felon-misdemeanant
anomaly, the Amendment did not fail rational basis review, the least
exacting standard of constitutional scrutiny.49 In addition, the Elev-
enth Circuit also affirmed 50 a district court's holding that the
Lautenberg Amendment did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.51 However, the Eleventh Circuit approached the equal pro-
tection issue through a different lens than the District of Columbia
Circuit.52
The recent litigation involving the constitutionality of the
Lautenberg Amendment focuses on the applicability of the public in-
terest exception. The temporary circuit split over the Lautenberg
Amendment created by the District of Columbia Circuit in FOP I, FOP
H's timid reversal of the original decision, and the courts' different
approaches to the equal protection questions involved all highlight a
45 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("FOP "), rev'k 981 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997), reh'g
granted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev'd on reh'g, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1999) (No. 99-106). For a discussion of FOP I, see
infra Part II.B.2.c.
46 See id. at 1002-03.
47 See id. at 1004.
48 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("FOP
R/'), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1999) (No. 99-106). For a discussion of
FOP 1, see infra Part II.B.2.d.
49 See id. at 903-04.
50 See Hiley v. Barrett, 155 F.3d 1276, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998).
51 See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1572-75 (N.D.
Ga. 1997), afi'd sub nom. Hiley v. Barrett, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998). For a discussion
of Barret4 see infra Part II.B.1.
52 The plaintiffs in Barrett claimed that "irrationally distinguishing between persons
convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence and persons convicted of other
types of misdemeanor crimes of violence" violates the Equal Protection Clause. Barett, 968
F. Supp. at 1572. They also claimed that the Lautenberg Amendment violates the Equal
Protection Clause by "irrationally allowing felons, but not domestic violence misdemean-
ants, to possess a firearm once their civil rights have been restored under [state law] ...
and [by] discriminating against domestic violence misdemeanants who are law enforce-
ment officers." Id.
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fundamental question: Should the federal government allow members
of the police and the military to own and possess firearms despite do-
mestic violence convictions?
This Note attempts to grapple with this fundamental question by
investigating how effectively the underlying purposes of the
Lautenberg Amendment apply in the police and military context.
Part I of this Note describes the Lautenberg Amendment, traces its
legislative history, and places it within the context of state and federal
domestic violence and gun control legislations. Part II details the fed-
eral court responses and legislative challenges to the Lautenberg
Amendment. Part I discusses the constitutionality of the Lautenberg
Amendment, focusing on whether the Second Amendment triggers
strict scrutiny for the purpose of equal protection analysis. Part Ill
argues that the courts should review the Lautenberg Amendment
under a rational basis analysis; despite the felon-misdemeanant anom-
aly, the Amendment should survive the rational basis test. Finally, this
Note concludes that as a policy matter, Congress should remedy the
current law's felon-misdemeanant anomaly by explicitly precluding
the public interest exception from applying to any domestic violence
perpetrators, whether convicted of felonies or misdemeanors. Retain-
ing the public interest exception in the area of domestic violence seri-
ously undermines the purpose and efficacy of the Lautenberg
Amendment.
I
LEGISLATION ON GUNS AND DoMEsnc VIOLENCE
Although society has long recognized the existence of domestic
violence,53 specific legislation to combat it is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon.54 To the extent that law enforcement responded to do-
mestic violence at all, it had done so through existing state assault laws
or state and local criminal and civil protection order laws. 55 The mid-
1980s, however, marked a turning point as authorities began to pay
increasing attention to the development of tactical response to domes-
tic violence. Informed by the feminist political movement's call for
awareness of spousal abuse56 and the first research experiments on
domestic violence,57 the public, policymakers, and the police all be-
53 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 848 ("Throughout this country's history, domestic
violence has been a culturally recognized but often denied social ill.").
54 See id. at 848-49 ("Congress did little until the groundswell of public opinion and
activist group pressure forced attention on child abuse in the 1970s and spousal abuse in
the mid-1980s.").
55 See Fine, supra note 4, at 253 & nn.1-2.
56 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 852 & n.19.
57 See Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Ex-
periment, 1 PoucE FouND. REP. 1 (1984); see also Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk,
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gan reassessing traditional approaches to domestic violence. 58 As a
result, local, state, and federal governments proposed and passed new
legislation.
By 1990, ninety-three percent of local police departments and
seventy-seven percent of sheriffs' departments had developed official
policies for confronting domestic disputes.59 Additionally, by this
time forty-five percent of police departments and forty percent of the
sheriffs' departments had created special domestic violence units. 60
Soon states also began to pass statewide legislation mandating law en-
forcement intervention in domestic violence disputes. By 1992, legis-
lation requiring mandatory arrest of domestic violence perpetrators
existed in fourteen states and the District of Columbia.61
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, Congress also turned its atten-
tion to what it perceived as the national epidemic of domestic vio-
lence. 62 Beginning in 1984, Congress passed a series of federal
statutes addressing this issue.6 3 Although federal legislation initially
focused primarily on compensating victims and funding domestic vio-
lence shelters, 64 by the early 1990s Congress had begun incorporating
domestic violence provisions into comprehensive crime bills such as
the Crime Control Act of 199065 and the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994.66 Ultimately, the federal effort
culminated with the inclusion of the Violence Against Women Act in
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.67
The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for-Domestic Assaul, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 261 (1984) (discuss-
ing the results of a study showing that police intervention substantially reduced spousal
abuse recidivism).
58 See Stevenson, supra note 17, at 851-54.
59 See BJS FxNDn sS, supra note 6, at 5 (citing a 1990 Law Enforcement Management
and Administrative Statistics Survey).
60 See id.
61 See id. (citing Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary
and Recommendations, Juv. & FAm. CT. J., 1992, No. 4, at 63). These states include Arizona,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. See id.
62 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMsEN: AN OVERVIEW 6 (1994) (reporting that the American Medical Association found
domestic violence to be a national health problem of "epidemic proportions").
63 See Victims of Crime Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18, 39, and 42 U.S.C.) (creating federal funds for state
agency assistance to victims of domestic violence); Family Violence Prevention and Services
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10418 (1994 & Supp. II 1997) (authorizing federal assistance for
domestic violence shelters, research, resources, and training).
64 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 10401-10413.
65 Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12, 15, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
66 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2,
8, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 31, and 42 U.S.C.).
67 tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18,
28, and 42 U.S.C.). For example, VAWA prohibits domestic violence and order of protec-
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A. State Gun Control and Domestic Violence Laws
State laws focused specifically on the intersection of domestic vio-
lence and gun control fit into the earlier portion of this larger histori-
cal picture. Initially, regulations passed to disarm domestic violence
offenders occurred exclusively at the state level. States have addressed
and continue to address the issue of domestic violence and gun con-
trol through a variety of legislative approaches. 68 These different vehi-
cles for disarming domestic violence assailants vary in their stringency,
duration, discretionary leniency, and retroactivity. Because recent
federal legislative efforts such as the Lautenberg Amendment attempt
to add uniformity to state legislation, it is necessary to examine system-
atically what states have and have not done to disarm domestic vio-
lence offenders.
Only two states-Arizona and New Jersey-have domestic vio-
lence laws that specifically mandate police seizure of weapons at all
domestic violence incident scenes. 69 Prosecutors then have the op-
tion to follow the seizures with forfeiture proceedings. 70
States with more lenient domestic violence and gun control laws
allow for weapon seizure only if the perpetrator used the weapon or
threatened to use the weapon against the victim.71 These laws often
include provisions granting the state ten or fewer days to petition for
permanent forfeiture.72
tion violations with an interstate dimension, allows the victim to speak to the danger posed
by defendant during a pretrial detention hearing, provides for victim restitution, mandates
that states give full faith and credit to all valid protection orders issued from other jurisdic-
tions, and creates a federal civil rights cause of action for gender motivated crimes. See id.
For a full discussion of VAWA's provisions and constitutionality, see generally Fine, supra
note 4.
68 See, e.g., Melanie L. Mecka, Note, Seizing the Ammunitionfrom Domestic Violence: Prohib-
iting the Ownership of Firearms by Abusers, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 607, 610-29 (1998) (describing in
detail New Jersey's gun control law against domestic violence offenders and comparing it
to similar laws in other states). The Mecka article contributed to the development of the
state survey presented in this section.
69 SeeAiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1--3601 (C) (West Supp. 1999) (allowing a peace officer
to temporarily seize a weapon upon learning of or observing weapon's presence either
through a plain view discovery or upon a consensual search); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
21(d) (1) (West 1995) (allowing police officer "who has probable cause to believe that an
act of domestic violence" has occurred to inquire into the presence of weapons and to
seize any weapons that the officer believes pose a danger).
70 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (F) (West Supp. 1999) (allowing prosecutor to
file forfeiture proceedings if, in the prosecutor's judgment, offender poses a threat to the
victim and also placing forfeiture decision within the court's discretion); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:25-21 (d) (2) to (3) (West 1995) (granting return of weapon to offender after 45 days
unless a county prosecutor successfully petitions to family court for permanent forfeiture).
71 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.8(A) (West Supp. 2000) (permitting seizure
of a weapon by peace officer when a perpetrator uses it to commit an act of domestic
violence).
72 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12028.5(e) (West Supp. 1999); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 134-7.5(d) (1) (Michie Supp. 1999) (requiring return of weapon within seven days if not
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Some states7 3 approach the problem through gun control laws
rather than domestic violence statutes by completely disqualifying a
person with a domestic violence conviction from owning or possessing
a permit to own a firearm. 74 Other states, such as Kentucky and Wis-
consin, limit firearm disqualification only to those currently under a
restraining order.75
Finally, many states have civil or criminal protective order statutes
that allow issuing courts to prohibit the perpetrator from possessing
or purchasing firearms while the order is in effect. Although these
statutes vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, certain general
legislative patterns have emerged. States such as New Hampshire and
NewJersey categorically prevent a defendant under a protective order
from possessing any firearm or weapon. 76 A less stringent statute in
Alaska only allows the issuing courts to order the surrender of fire-
arms, actually used in the domestic violence incident leading to the
protective order.77
retained for evidentiary purpose); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/304(c) (West Supp. 1999)
(stating that seized weapon "shall be returned forthwith").
73 These states include Alaska, Hawaii, and Utah.
74 Unlike the Lautenberg Amendment, discussed infra Part I.B.3, most state statues
prohibiting domestic violence convicts from possessing firearms limit the retroactive appli-
cation by requiring the domestic violence conviction to have occurred within the last six
years in order for the gun control disqualification to apply. See e.g., ALAsKA STAT.
§ 18.65.705(4) (Michie 1998) (disqualifying on the basis of two or more convictions of
misdemeanors within the past six years); WAsH. Rv. CODE ANN. § 9.41.040(1) (b) (i) (West
1999) (prohibiting possession of firearms by a person convicted of domestic violence of-
fense on or afterJuly 1, 1993).
75 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 237.110(11) (Banks-Baldwin 1999) (enforcing sus-
pension of firearm permit until expiration of order or until issuing judge terminates the
suspension); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12(4m) (b) (1) (West Supp. 1999) (requiring the sur-
render of firearm until domestic violence injunction is vacated or expires); see also NEv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.3657(3) (g) (Michie 1997) (mandating that sheriffs deny or revoke
permit of individuals with domestic violence convictions); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3(c) (6)
(West 1995) (denying a permit to purchase firearms to anyone subject to domestic vio-
lence court order); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269.8(a) (1999) (prohibiting individuals under
domestic violence orders from purchasing firearms); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-4(a) (6) (1997)
(denying state firearm license to anyone facing pending charges or subject to court-or-
dered supervision or restraining order for domestic violence).
76 See N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(II) (Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-
29(b) (16) (West Supp. 1999). Both the New Hampshire and the NewJersey statutes also
authorize the issuing court to order a search and seizure for firearms and other weapons.
See N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4(H); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (16). For states that
allow issuing courts to enforce firearm surrender but do not permit searches and seizures,
see CAL. FAM. CODE § 6389 (West Supp. 1999); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-1-1001(3) (c) (1999);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (a) (8) (Supp. 1998); and MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAw § 4-
506(d) (11) (1999).
77 See, e.g., AL-AsKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c) (6)-(7) (Michie 1998). Other states with simi-
lar statutes to that of Alaska extend their laws slightly by granting the court discretion to
order weapon surrender if the court reasonably believes that the defendant poses a violent
risk to the victim. See, e.g., N.D. CET. CODE § 14-07.1-13(2) (1997).
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As this description indicates, not all states have attempted to dis-
arm domestic violence perpetrators, 78 and even among the states that
do, there is a lack of uniformity. Additionally, state officials do not
uniformly and consistently enforce these laws.79 These factors suggest
the need for a uniform federal effort consistently enforced by both
law enforcement and the courts.
B. Federal Gun Control and Domestic Violence Laws
Congress has passed two laws dealing specifically with domestic
violence and gun control. Both pieces of legislation amended the ex-
isting federal gun control law, the Gun Control Act of 1968.80 The
first amendment took effect in 199481 and dealt only with domestic
violence evidenced by the issuance of a court protective order.8 2 The
second law, the Lautenberg Amendment 83 passed in 1996, was far
broader in scope; it restricts gun possession by anyone with a domestic
violence misdemeanor conviction.84 Although the clear purpose of
both pieces of legislation is to combat the particular harm of domestic
violence, one cannot understand either their effect or their potential
constitutional infirmities without first examining their places in the
broader context of federal gun control legislation.
1. Background-The Gun Control Act of 1968
The purpose of the GCA, which superseded the Federal Firearms
Act of 1938,85 was to withhold access to weapons from dangerous indi-
viduals. Congress passed the GCA under the authority given by the
Commerce Clause. 6 This sweeping gun control legislation placed li-
78 See Mecka, supra note 68, at 622-29 (listing current and proposed state legislation in
the area of domestic violence and firearm laws and arguing that "all states should be send-
ing the message to abusers that they can no longer violate the rights of victims and keep all
of their rights too, such as the right to bear arms").
79 See id. at 629. "'The whole idea was to take guns out of the hands of abusers. That
doesn't happen with this law.'" (quoting a Wisconsin county sheriff's comment about the
efficacy of that state's law).
80 Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18
and 26 U.S.C.).
81 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110401, 108 Stat. 2014 (1994).
82 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (8), (g)(8), (h) (1994).
83 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009-371 (1996).
84 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a) (33) (A), 922(d)(8)-(9), 922(g)(8)-(9) (1994 & Supp. III
1997).
85 ch. 850, 52 Stat. 1250 (amended and repealed 1968).
86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3. The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to
regulate commerce among the states. From 1937 until 1995, the Supreme Court's Com-
merce Clause doctrine allowed Congress to exercise virtually unbridled power to pass fed-
eral laws under this Clause. See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce
Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MicH. L. REV. 554, 562 (1995)
("Current doctrine (pre-Lopez) allows one to justify federal regulation by pointing to any
connection between the activity regulated, whether in the particular instance or in the
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censing restrictions on the sale and manufacture of guns, as well as
criminalizing certain conduct relating to the possession of firearms.8 7
Sections 922(d) and (g) of the GCA-the sections later expanded
by the 1994 amendment and the Lautenberg Amendment-created
disqualification classes.88 Disqualified individuals under the original
GCA included: anyone convicted of "a crime punishable by imprison-
ment for a term exceeding one year"8 9 ("felon"), fugitives, 90 drug ad-
dicts,91 mental incompetents, 92 illegal aliens, 93 those dishonorably
discharged from the armed services, 94 and those who have renounced
their U.S. citizenship. 95 Under § 922(d), a licensed dealer may not
sell or distribute weapons to anyone who falls within one of the dis-
qualification categories, while § 9 22(g) prohibits disqualified individ-
uals from transporting or possessing a firearm. For example,
§ 9 22(g) (1) makes it a federal felony for a person with a previous fel-
ony conviction to possess a firearm.
The original GCA, and all amendments to the Act prior to the
Lautenberg Amendment, created a safe harbor for military and law
enforcement personnel by exempting from its prohibitions "any fire-
arm or ammunition imported for, sold or shipped to, or issued for the
use of, the United States or any department or agency thereof or any
expansive aggregate, and some crossing of a state line by something or someone, some-
time, somewhere."). In 1995 this doctrine shifted with the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lope; the Court struck down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990 as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause authority. See id. at
552. According to the Court, the subject matter of the Act, possession of firearms within
1000 feet of schools, did not have any substantial effect on interstate commerce. See id. at
561.
87 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (1994) (specifying unlawful acts related to the importation,
manufacture, transport, and possession of firearms and ammunition); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(creating disqualification categories for firearm possession and transport affecting inter-
state commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (1994) (providing that "[n]o person shall engage in
the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or importing or manu-
facturing ammunition, until" receiving the required license).
88 Referring to disqualification categories under § 922(g), 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) prohib-
its disqualified individuals from receiving, transporting, or possessing firearms in the
course of employment. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1994). Since the Lautenberg Amendment
did not expand on this provision, this Note will not examine it specifically.
89 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, 1220 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (1) (1994)).
90 See id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2) (1994)).
91 See id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (3) (1994)) (specifying anyone
unlawfully using or being addicted to a controlled substance as defined by the Controlled
Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 102, 84 Stat. 1242, 1242-45 (1970) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 802 (1994))).
92 See id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (4) (1994)) (specifying anyone
who "has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to any mental
institution").
93 See id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (5) (1994)).
94 See id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(6) (1994)).
95 See id. (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (7) (1994)).
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State or any department, agency, or political subdivision thereof."96
This so-called public-interest exception permits a military, police, or
government official to possess a gun for official use, even after a fel-
ony conviction.
Despite a dearth of federal case law discussing the application of
§ 925(a) (1) in the context of the police exemption, the issue appears
to have been resolved in 1978 by the Ninth Circuit in Hyland v.
Fukuda.97 In this case, the plaintiff (Hyland) in a civil rights action
challenged the state of Hawaii's refusal to hire him as an adult correc-
tions officer.98 The state based its decision on a belief that Hyland's
previous felony conviction for armed robbery disqualified him under
18 U.S.C. § 922 (h) from carrying a weapon-a necessary condition of
employment.99 The court, however, took a different approach. Not-
ing that "any firearm Hyland might be permitted to carry in the posi-
tion he seeks would be owned by, and used exclusively for, the
state,"100 the court affirmed the district court's decision and held that
§ 922 does not justify the state's refusal to hire Hyland.10' Since "the
plain terms of section 925(a) (1) remove firearms owned by the state
and used exclusively for its purposes from the limitations of section
922," the previous felony conviction should not interfere with Hy-
land's state job opportunities.10 2 In other words, the court inter-
preted § 925(a) (1) as exempting Hyland from the GCA provision.
96 18 U.S.C. § 925(a) (1) (1994) (amended 1996). It is worth noting that most states
also have laws barring felons from possessing firearms. See Fraternal Order of Police v.
United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir.), reh'ggranted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(per curiam), rev'd on reh'g, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S.
Oct. 12, 1999) (No. 99-106).
97 580 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1978).
98 See id. at 978.
99 See id. at 979.
100 Id.
101 See id.
102 Id. Ultimately the court held that Hyland was prohibited from carrying a firearm
under a different, but overlapping statute. See id. (referring to 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)
(repealed 1986)). Sections 1202(a) and 922(h) are nearly identical in statutory language.
Congress passed the two statutes under different titles, titles VII and IV respectively, within
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(1968). See 580 F.2d at 979 n.3 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 341-43 (1971)).
The court held that no explicit or implicit equivalent of § 925(a) exists that would exempt
Hyland from the prohibition of § 1202(a). See id. at 980. However, the inclusion of Hy-
land within the prohibited class of § 1202 (a) is now moot, because the law was repealed by
Congress on May 19, 1986. See Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(b), 100 Stat. 459 (1986).
For a discussion of the application of 18 U.S.C. § 925(a), see Perri v. Department of the
Treasury, 637 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that § 925(a) (1) does not apply to
sale of firearms to an undercover agent who is a convicted felon). But cf United States v.
Kozerski, 518 F. Supp. 1082, 1091 (D.N.H. 1981) ("[I]t follows that neither 18 U.S.C.
§ 925(a) (1) nor any purported application of state statutes here exempted defendant [a
rural police officer] from the application of the federal firearms laws the violation of which
forms the basis of the instant indictment.").
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Under this ruling, Hyland, despite his felony conviction, was permit-
ted to possess a weapon for use in the course of his official duties.
Prior to the passage of the Lautenberg Amendment, the original
GCA and all subsequent amendments left the public-interest excep-
don intact. Surprisingly, there is almost no evidence in the Congres-
sional Record or subsequent case law explaining Congress's specific
motivation in creating this broad and significant exemption. 03
2. The Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1994
Congress enacted the first domestic-violence-specific amendment
to the GCA in 1994.104 It prohibits anyone subject to certain protec-
tive orders from owning or possessing a gun.10 5 It also prohibits any-
one from selling or transferring a gun to someone whom they know or
should reasonably believe to be under a restraining order.10 6 In order
to fall within this provision, the protective order must restrain harass-
ment, stalking, or threatening of an "intimate partner." 07
Until the enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment in 1996,
members of the police and military were uniformly exempt from this
provision under 18 U.S.C. § 925 (a) (1)-the general public-interest
exception of the GCA.'08
103 See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp. 2d 811, 829 (S.D. Ind. 1998). While
acknowledging a lack of authority on congressional intent, the Gillespie court still rejected
the plaintiff police officer's argument regarding the possible motivation behind the
exception:
Gillespie contends that Congress previously provided the exemption... in
recognition of state sovereignty, particularly, the states' police powers, and
that Congress' subsequent denial of this exemption [by the Lautenberg
Amendment] constitutes an impermissible invasion of the states' police
power .... Gillespie provides no case law, legislative history or other sup-
port for this bare contention, and the Court has been unable to locate any au-
thority on poinL
... Nevertheless, we cannot create legislative intent out of whole cloth,
and.., we are not free to speculate as to congressional intent.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). For a similar claim as to the motivation behind
the exception, see Hearings on H.R 26 and HR. 445, supra note 12 (statement of WilliamJ.
Johnson, General Counsel, National Association of Police Organizations Inc.), available in
<http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/udiciary/hju58106.000/hju58106-Of.htm>
[hereinafterJohnson Testimony) ("[T]he exception is a necessary and constitutionally man-
dated recognition of the fact that state and local governments may not be dictated to by
Congress in matters of state and local enforcement of state and local law.").
104 See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 110401, 108 Stat. 2014, 2014-15 (1994).
105 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (8) (1994).
106 See id. § 922(d)(8).
107 Id. Intimate partner is defined as a spouse, a former spouse, parent of a mutual
child, cohabitant, or former cohabitant. See id. § 921 (a) (32).
108 See Major Einwechter & Captain Christiansen, Abuse Your Spouse and Lose Your Job:
Federal Law Now Prohibits Some Soldiers From Possessing Militay Weapons, ARm, LAw., Aug.
1997, at 25, 26 n.79.
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3. The Lautenberg Amendment
Faced with statistical affirmation of the danger of armed domestic
violence perpetrators, policymakers at the federal level rallied for
stronger gun control provisions in domestic violence law. 109 Proposed
by Senator Frank Lautenberg, a Democrat from NewJersey, on March
21, 1996,110 the Lautenberg Amendment passed overwhelmingly by a
vote of ninety-seven to two in the Senate."1 President Clinton signed
the law four months later as part of an omnibus federal spending
bill.112
The Amendment adds another disqualification category to the
GCA. Under the Amendment, "any person . . . who has been con-
victed in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" is
prohibited from owning or possessing firearms and ammunition. 1 3
Furthermore, anyone who has been convicted of a misdemeanor 14
involving the use or attempted use of force or threat with a deadly
weapon against a spouse, child, intimate partner, or other cohabitant
is prohibited from owning or possessing firearms and ammunition."15
Punishment for violation of these provisions can result in a felony con-
viction, fine of $250,000, maximum imprisonment of ten years, or any
combination of the above." 6
Although there were no hearings on the Lautenberg Amendment
in either the Senate or the House of Representatives, 1 7 both the de-
bate on the floor of the Senate and the nearly unanimous vote in
favor of passage reveal Congress's strong endorsement of the amend-
ment. Focusing in particular on the reality of domestic violence pros-
ecutions, which are almost always charged as, or plea-bargained down
to, misdemeanor convictions, supporters of the law saw it as an oppor-
tunity to close a loophole existing under the GCA."18
109 See Remarks in Columbus, Ohio, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1355, 1358-59 (Aug. 26, 1996) (Wil-
liam J. Clinton) (address to Columbus Police Academy).
110 See S. 1632, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted).
111 See 142 CONG. REc. S10,380 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996).
112 SeeJames Bovard, Disarming Those Who Need Guns Mos; WALL ST.J., Dec. 23,1996, at
A12.
113 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
114 Misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is defined under either state or federal
law for the purposes of the amendment. See id. § 921(a) (33) (A) (i).
11-5 See id. § 922(g) (8)-(9). For a list of the pertinent changes to the GCA by the
Lautenberg Amendment, see Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009-371, 3009-371 to
3009-372.
116 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (2) (1994).
117 See Hearings on H.R. 26 and HI.R 445, supra note 12 (opening statement of Rep.
McCollum), available in <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju58106.
000/hju58106_0f.htm> [hereinafter McCollum Opening Statement].
118 See 142 CONG. REC. S10,378 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Well-
stone). For a discussion of the policy argument underlying the Lautenberg Amendment,
see infra Part III.B.
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In prepassage discussion of the Lautenberg Amendment in the
Congressional Record, perhaps the most notable issues are not those ad-
dressed by legislators, but those that apparently escaped deliberation.
Although the Amendment diverged from all previous provisions of
the GCA by stating explicitly that the public-interest exception would
not apply to government entities when domestic violence misdemean-
ors were involved, discussion of this significant change in federal gun
control law ensued only after the law's passage.
This unprecedented restriction is arguably the most important
change in the GCA effected by the Lautenberg Amendment. How-
ever, news accounts published after the passage of the law suggest that
this feature was not part of Senator Lautenberg's original proposal.
These accounts further suggest that the removal of the public-interest
exception in cases of domestic violence misdemeanor convictions was
actually a strategic effort to undermine the legislation." 9 For exam-
ple, one report astonishingly claims that the exemption was removed
not by gun control advocates, but rather by Representative Bob Ban, a
Republican from Georgia and a well-known opponent of federal gun
control legislation.120 This news report quotes Senator Lautenberg as
charging the Republicans with removing the exemption "'in the dark
of the night"' so that the law would contain a "'poison pill"' that
would become a basis for public opposition.' 2 ' The controversy over
the removal of the public-interest exception has been exacerbated by
other reports which indicate that Representative Barr was in fact un-
willing to claim responsibility for lifting the exception. 22
II
CHALLENGES TO THE LAUTENBERG AM:ENDMENT
The prepassage legislative silence when Senator Lautenberg's bill
was introduced to Congress stands in stark contrast to the high-
pitched fervor that has followed the Amendment's passage. Since its
enactment, the Lautenberg Amendment has been the target of severe
criticism.123 Despite the strong Congressional endorsement of the bill
evidenced by the Senate vote, lobbyists and members of Congress
quickly attempted to curtail the impact and reach of the new law.' 24
119 See, e.g., David Pace, AP, Jan. 8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2492802.
120 See id.
121 Id. (quoting Sen. Lautenberg).
122 See, e.g., Suro & Pan, supra note 36.
123 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 36.
124 Within a few months of the Amendment's passage, three bills were introduced in
the House of Representatives to counter the effects of the Amendment: H.R. 1009, 105th
Cong. (1997), introduced by Representative Helen Chenoweth, repeals the law in its en-
tirety; H.R. 26, 105th Cong. (1997), introduced by Representative Bob Barr, eliminates the
retroactive effect of the law; and H.R. 445, 105th Cong. (1997), introduced by Representa-
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At the same time, police organizations and individual officers began
challenging the law in federal courts. 125
A. Legislative Challenge-The Stupak Bill
The Lautenberg Amendment is facing several legislative chal-
lenges. One proposal focuses exclusively on the Lautenberg Amend-
ment's elimination of the public-interest exception for domestic
violence misdemeanants. Introduced by Representative Bart Stupak
on January 9, 1997 to the House Judiciary Committee, House Bill 445
provides that firearm prohibitions applicable by reason of a domestic
violence misdemeanor conviction would not apply to government en-
tities. 126 The effect of this amendment would be to exempt military
and police personnel with domestic violence misdemeanor convic-
tions from the GCA's disqualification categories. Under the proposed
bill, members of the military and the police with domestic violence
misdemeanor convictions may continue to use weapons in an official
capacity.
Although there has been no movement on this bill since the ad-
journment of the 1998 Congressional session, 127 subcommittee hear-
ings were held in March 1997 to discuss changes to the gun ownership
ban on domestic violence misdemeanants.128 Organizations such as
the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence 129 and the National
Network to End Domestic Violence' 30 testified in support of the cur-
rent law. In addition, one police organization, the National Black Po-
lice Association, broke ranks from other police organizations and
spoke in favor of the elimination of the public-interest exception.' 3 '
tive Bart Stupak, creates an on-duty exemption for law enforcement officers and the
military.
125 See cases cited supra note 35.
126 See H.R. 445, 105th Cong. (1997).
127 United States Bill Tracking. Domestic Violence Misdemeanor Applicability, available in
Westlaw, 1997 US H.B. 445 (SN). For another informative source of federal bill tracking,
see THOMAS Bill Summary & Status: 105th Congress, 1997-1998 (visited Nov. 23, 1999)
<http://thomas/loc.gov/bss/dl05query.htnl>.
128 See McCollur, Opening Statement, supra note 117.
129 See Hearings on H.R 26 and H.R. 445, supra note 12 (written testimony of Rita
Smith, Executive Director, National Coalition Against Domestic Violence), available in
1997 WL 8219766 [hereinafter Smith Testimony].
130 See id. (statement of Donna F. Edwards, Executive Director, National Network to
End Domestic Violence), available in <http://commdocs.house.gove/committees/udici-
ary/hju58106.000/hju58106Of.htm> [hereinafter Edwards Testimony].
131 See id. (statement of Ronald E. Hampton, Executive Director, National Black Police
Association), available in <http://commdocs.house.gov/conunittees/udiciary/hju58106.
000/hju5806_Of.htm> [hereinafter Hampton Testimony].
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Testifying in favor of the Stupak Bill were the National Association of
Police Organizations 32 and the Fraternal Order of Police. 33
B. Federal Court Challenges-A Recent Circuit Split
To date there are two federal court of appeals decisions on the
Lautenberg Amendment as it pertains to members of the police force.
Hiley v. Barrett'3 4 and Fraternal Order of Police v. United States ("FOP 1') 135
originally reached opposite conclusions on whether the Lautenberg
Amendment violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, thereby temporarily creating a circuit split. However, the cir-
cuit split soon disappeared when the District of Columbia Circuit
vacated its decision in FOP , and reversed its holding on the equal
protection question in FOP I, the FOP H court held that the
Lautenberg Amendment does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
1. The Eleventh Circuit-Hiley v. Barrett
In 1990 William Hiley started his employment as a deputy sheriff
in Fulton County, Georgia. 3 6 At that time, the sheriff's department
issued a firearm to Hiley in accordance with its employment require-
ment. 3 7 Five years later, Hiley pled no contest to a misdemeanor
charge of domestic violence, resulting in twelve months of proba-
tion.138 A year after Hiley's sentencing, Congress passed the
Lautenberg Amendment.8 9 In response, the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms (ATF) issued a statement to all state and local law
enforcement officials, suggesting that they take "'appropriate action"'
upon discovering employees subject to the new weapons prohibi-
tion. 140 Soon thereafter, the Fulton County Sheriff, Jacqueline Bar-
132 See Johnson Testimony, supra note 103.
133 See Hearings on H.R. 26 and HI? 445, supra note 12 (statement of Bernard H. Te-
odorski, National Vice President Grand Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police), available in
<http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/udiciary/hju58106.000/hju58106_Of.htm>
[hereinafter Teodorski Testimony].
'34 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998). The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
decision to uphold the Lautenberg Amendment in a one sentence opinion: "This case is
affirmed for the reasons stated in the district court's thorough and well-reasoned order
...." Barrett, 155 F.3d at 1277. As a result, this Note's discussion of the case attributed to
the Ilth Circuit will cite to the district court opinion. See National Ass'n of Gov't Employ-
ees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1997), affd sub nom. Hiley v. Barrett, 155 F.3d
1276 (11th Cir. 1998).
135 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir.), reh'ggranted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam),
rev'd on reh'g 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1999)
(No. 99-106).
136 See Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1568.
137 See id.
138 See id. At the time, Hiley informed the Sheriff's Department of his conviction. The
Department took no action against Hiley. See id.
139 See id.
140 Id. (citing ATF's open letter to state and local law enforcement officials).
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rett, fired Hiley.' 41 As a member of a peace officers' union, the
National Association of Government Employees (NAGE), Hiley
brought suit for permanent injunctive relief enjoining enforcement of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (9) against any NAGE member.142 Hiley asserted
three distinct equal protection claims: 143
Plaintiff... assert[s] that § 9 22(g) (9) violates the Equal Protection
Clause... by: (1) irrationally distinguishing between persons con-
victed of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence and persons
convicted of other types of misdemeanor crimes of violence; (2) ir-
rationally allowing felons, but not domestic violence misdemean-
ants, to possess a firearm once their civil rights have been restored
under the laws of the relevant state; and (3) discriminating against
domestic violence misdemeanants who are law enforcement
officers.'4
The court commenced its analysis by identifying rational basis review
as the appropriate level of scrutiny for all three equal protection
claims, since the claims involved neither a fundamental right nor a
suspect class. 145
Turning to the first equal protection challenge-the law irration-
ally distinguishes between domestic violence misdemeanants and
other types of misdemeanants-the court quoted Senator
Lautenberg's statement from the Congressional Record: "'[T]he pres-
ence of a gun dramatically increases the likelihood that domestic vio-
lence will escalate into murder.'", 46 The court held that reduction of
the likelihood of domestic violence was a legitimate goal and that in
distinguishing between domestic violence misdemeanants and other
misdemeanants, Congress created a rational legislative classification in
order to bring about this purpose. 147 Furthermore, the court argued,
even if Congress were to eventually disarm all criminal misdemean-
141 See id. Her notification letter to Hiley stated that "I[i~f an employee authorized to
carry a County-issued firearm and ammunition is affected by [§ 922(g) (9)], the employee
may not possess any firearm or ammunition....'" Id. (alteration in original)).
142 See id. at 1568-69.
143 See id. at 1572-75. In addition to the equal protection arguments, the court rejected
Hiley's Commerce Clause, substantive due process, ex post facto, bill of attainder, and
Tenth Amendment claims. See id. at 1572, 1575-78.
144 Id. at 1572.
145 See id at 1573. Equal protection analysis and levels of scrutiny are discussed infra
Part II.A.
146 Barrett, 968 F. Supp. at 1573 (quoting 142 CONG. REc. S11,227 (daily ed. Sept. 25,
1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg)).
147 See id. ("The court does not doubt that limiting the ability of a domestic violence
misdemeanant to possess a firearm is reasonably related to Congress' purpose of protect-
ing public safety by keeping firearms out of the hands of potentially dangerous or irrespon-
sible persons.").
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ants, the legislature is permitted to address problems "'one step at a
time"' 14without violating equal protection.
The court also rejected Hiley's second equal protection claim
that state firearm restoration laws and 18 U.S.C. § 922 produce an
anomaly when applied to domestic violence misdemeanants as op-
posed to felons.149 Under both the felony provision of the GCA as
well as the domestic violence misdemeanor provision added by the
Lautenberg Amendment, if state law provides for the loss of civil
rights and then those civil rights are subsequently restored, the dis-
qualifying provisions will cease to apply.150 Since the majority of states
do not deprive individuals of their civil rights based on misdemeanor
convictions, they cannot restore these rights to trigger the exemption.
As a result, Hiley argued, "the statute produces an anomaly whereby
certain felons may be able to possess firearms, but domestic violence
misdemeanants will not.' 5  However, the Court held that even if this
anomaly occurs, it is the result of differing state laws; this anomaly
does not present an equal protection problem according to the
court's analysis. 15 2 Rather, it is the unavoidable consequence of a fed-
eral exemption dependent upon varying state laws. 15 3
Finally, the court addressed Hiley's third equal protection argu-
ment that the law unfairly burdens police officers.' 54 Unlike other
careers, police work requires officers to legally possess a firearm.
Hiley argued that the law discriminates against the police by forcing
only police officers with domestic violence misdemeanor convictions
out of their jobs. 155 As with Hiley's two other claims, the court re-
jected this contention, stating that constitutional concerns are not
raised simply because a rational classification produces uneven ef-
fects. 156 Uneven effects are only constitutionally problematic if they
result from discriminatory intent.157 Since the court found no con-
gressional intent to discriminate against law enforcement officers, it
held that Hiley's third claim failed to prove an equal protection
violation. 158
148 Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)).
149 See id. 1573-74.
150 See id. at 1574. For the felony civil rights restoration provision, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 921 (a) (20) (1994). For the domestic violence misdemeanor civil rights restoration provi-
sion, see 18 U.S.C. § 921 (a) (33) (Supp. 1I 1997).
151 Barret4 968 F. Supp. at 1574.
152 See id. (citing United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1995)).
153 See id. (citing McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1995)).
154 See id. at 1575.
155 See id.
156 See id. (citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
157 See id.
158 See id.
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2. The District of Columbia Circuit-Fraternal Order of Police v.
United States
a. Facts
The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), an association of law en-
forcement officers, brought suit challenging the new provisions of the
GCA introduced by the Lautenberg Amendment.159 As part of their
complaint, the FOP plaintiffs filed affidavits of two members with do-
mestic violence misdemeanor convictions.1 60 FOP claimed that appli-
cation of the Lautenberg Amendment, specifically 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (9), injured and will continue to injure the two officers as
well as other FOP members "by infringing on their constitutional
rights to possess firearms, impeding their ability to serve as law en-
forcement officers, diminishing their job-related responsibilities, and
resulting, for some of them, in termination of their employment."' 61
The Fraternal Order of Police, like Hiley in Barrett, argued that 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (9) violated the Equal Protection Clause. 162 Actually,
the FOP made two of the same equal protection claims as Hiley. First,
FOP argued that the law "irrationally target[s] a single class of misde-
meanants who had committed crimes of violence, and . . . dis-
criminat[es] against law enforcement officers who have been
convicted of misdemeanors of domestic violence."' 63 Additionally,
FOP argued that § 922 (g) (9) infringed upon its members' right to
bear arms.'64 The FOP claimed that the right to bear arms was a fun-
damental right for equal protection purposes in an attempt to per-
suade the court to review the Lautenberg Amendment provisions
under strict scrutiny, rather than under rational basis review.' 65
b. District Court Holding
The district court summarily dismissed FOP's argument that the
law implicated a fundamental right for equal protection purposes and
refused to apply strict scrutiny.166 The court then analyzed the two
159 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1997), rev'ad
152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir.), reh'ggranted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), affd on
reh'g, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1999) (No. 99-
106).
160 See id. at 3.
161 Id. (citing plaintiff's complaint).
162 See id. at 4.
163 Id.
164 See id.
165 Whether or not the Second Amendment triggers strict scrutiny for equal protec-
tion purposes is discussed infra Part MA.
166 See Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 4 ("There is no constitutionally protected
right to keep and bear a firearm, however, that does not have 'some reasonable relation-
ship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." (quoting United States v.
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equal protection claims under rational basis review. 167 The court re-
jected both of these claims, employing reasoning identical to that
used by the Georgia district court in Barrett.168 Thus, on the claim that
the law irrationally preferenced those who commit non-domestic-vio-
lence misdemeanors over those who commit domestic violence misde-
meanors, the court wrote:
The state of facts which provides a rational basis for the classifica-
tion at issue here is not only "reasonably conceivable" but was iden-
tified in the Senate: The sponsor of Section 922(g) (9), Senator
Frank Lautenberg, observed that a person "who attempts or threat-
ens violence against a loved one has demonstrated that he or she
poses an unacceptable risk."169
On the second equal protection claim, the court held that the dispa-
rate impact on police officers was irrelevant to constitutional analysis,
since the law was facially neutral and the FOP did not prove a discrimi-
natory purpose. 70
c. FOP I
A three judge panel of the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the district court decision.' 71 Although the circuit court ultimately
analyzed the case under the least exacting standard of equal protec-
tion review, it did not dismiss the Second Amendment issue as easily
as the lower court.' 72 Finding the Second Amendment issue "intrigu-
ing," and noting the recent increase in scholarly debate as to the na-
ture of the right to bear arms, the court nonetheless found it
unnecessary to "attempt to resolve the status of the Second Amend-
ment right."173 This inquiry was unnecessary, according to the court,
because the Lautenberg Amendment fell "into the narrow class of
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939))). For a discussion of Miller, see infra notes 201-05 and
accompanying text.
167 See Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 5 ("Section 9 22(g) (9) must be upheld if
the classification it establishes is 'rationally related to achievement of a legitimate govern-
mental interest.'" (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533
(1973))).
168 Although the court decided this case only three months after the Eleventh Circuit's
similar analysis of a closely related claim, the D.C. district court made no mention of the
Barrett decision.
169 Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 5 (quoting 142 CONG. REc. S11,227 (daily
ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg)).
170 See id.
171 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
revg 981 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997), reh'g granted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per
curiam), rev'd on reh'g, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 12,
1999) (No. 99-106).
172 See id. at 1002.
173 Id.
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provisions that fail even the most permissive, 'rational basis,'
review."174
The court held that there is no rational basis for distinguishing
between police officers who commit domestic violence misdemeanors
and those who commit more violent felonies.175 The court reasoned
that " [t] he government may not bar such people from possessing fire-
arms in the public interest while it imposes a lesser restriction on
those convicted of crimes that differ only in being more serious."1 76
In order to remedy the equal protection violation, the court struck
down the provision of the Lautenberg Amendment that explicitly pre-
cluded the public interest exception from applying to the case of a
domestic violence misdemeanor disqualification. 177 In other words,
the court resolved the underinclusiveness of this statutory exception
not by nullifying it with respect to domestic violence felons, but by
extending it to include domestic violence misdemeanants. 17
d. FOP H1
Following the original FOP I decision, the United States re-
quested, and was granted, a rehearing by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit.179 In granting rehearing, the court once again focused on the
anomaly created by the public interest exception to the Lautenberg
Amendment and ordered the parties to address the following
question:
[W]hether it is proper for the court to consider, as part of an equal
protecdoi challenge, a form of discrimination (between domestic
violence misdemeanants and domestic violence felons) not explic-
'74 Id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
175 See id. at 1002-1003. The Eleventh Circuit in Barrett also examined the Lautenberg
Amendment for potential equal protection violations. In Barrett, the court framed the
equal protection question differently and found no infirmity. See National Ass'n of Gov't
Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1572-75 (N.D. Ga. 1997), aJfd sub nom. Hiley v.
Barrett, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998); see also discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the
Barrett case).
176 Fraternal Order of Police, 152 F.3d at 1004.
177 See id. ("We think the most appropriate remedy is consequently to hold that § 925
is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to withhold the public interest exception from
those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors.").
178 The court could have chosen other remedial options. Instead of expanding the
exemption to domestic violence misdemeanants, the court could have eliminated the felon
exemption altogether or just in the case of domestic violence felons. Either of these op-
tions would remedy the statute's underinclusivity and cure the constitutional flaw. See Evan
H. Caminker, Note, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Underinclusive Statutes, 95 YALE L.J.
1185, 1185 (1986) (discussing the court's options of either invalidating a provision or en-
larging the statute's coverage according to "the legislative purposes animating the underly-
ing statutory scheme"); Note, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Exception Clause upon the
Remainder of a Statute; 55 HARv. L. Rxv. 1030, 1032 (1942) [hereinafter Note].
179 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per
curiam).
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itly asserted in the trial court or in counsel's briefs on appeal, when
the issue was raised in oral argument and... the merits of the equal
protection challenge in that form.'8 0
The circuit court ultimately reversed its earlier conclusion on the mer-
its of this equal protection issue.' 8 '
At first blush, the court's opinion reads like an affirmance of its
earlier holding:
Treating misdemeanants more harshly than felons seems irrational
in the conventional sense of that term.... [H] ere Congress... [is]
imposing a lesser disability on the felons, whom the state legislators
had singled out for more severe treatment. Thus the usual proposi-
tion that Congress is entitled to address a problem "one step at a
time" is not self-evidently applicable. 8 2
Given this statement, one would expect that the court would continue
to uphold the FOP Idecision, which considered it irrational to exempt
felons, but not domestic violence misdemeanants, from federal gun
control laws and thus extended the exemption to both. Instead, the
court in rather timid fashion stated that "on reflection" it is "not un-
reasonable for Congress" to have created the felon-misdemeanant
anomaly.'8 3 The court speculated that Congress created this anomaly
because "nonlegal restrictions such as formal and informal hiring
practices may... prevent felons from being issued firearms covered
by § 925(a) (1) in a large measure of the remaining cases." 184 In other
words, police and military organizations would be unlikely to hire
felons in the first place. Unfortunately, the court was vague in this
factual speculation and offered no further guidance as to what specific
facts would save the Lautenberg Amendment from the seeming irra-
tionality of the felon-misdemeanant anomaly. 85
Given the temporary circuit split on this question, the District of
Columbia Circuit's timid reversal, and the strong likelihood that other
circuits will reexamine this issue, it is necessary to explore whether
these courts appropriately framed and answered the equal protection
question. The following section undertakes this task.
180 Id. The use of this equal protection classification schema is discussed infra Part
III.2.
181 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 908 (D.C. Cir.), afl'g on
reh'g981 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1999) (No.
99-106).
182 Id. at 903 (citation omitted).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 904.
185 For an elaboration upon what the FOP H court likely meant, see infra Part III.A2.
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III
TIm LEGALrIy AND POLICY OF DISARMING ALL BATTERERS
A. Equal Protection Analysis: Is the Lautenberg Amendment
Unconstitutional?
Barrett, FOP I, and FOP 11 engage in traditional equal protection
analysis, as applied to the federal government through the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 86 Under the traditional analy-
sis, the court first determines the applicable level of scrutiny by
deciding whether a suspect class, 187 such as race, alienage, or national
origin, or a fundamental right, 88 such as the right to free speech,
vote, or interstate travel, is involved. If the law implicates either a sus-
pect class or a fundamental right then strict scrutiny requires the gov-
ernment to prove that the legislative classification is necessary to
advance a compelling governmental interest.189 If neither a suspect
class nor a fundamental right is involved, the court applies rational
basis review, which requires only that the law is rationally related to a
legitimate government interest. 90 The outcome of an equal protec-
tion analysis typically depends on the level of scrutiny applied. 191
Laws reviewed under strict scrutiny are usually struck down,192 while
those reviewed under the more lenient rational basis test often sur-
vive.193 In cases where the Court has struck down classifications under
rational basis review, they usually detected an illegitimate discrimina-
tory purpose underlying a facially neutral classification. 94
186 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment places the same restrictions on fed-
eral action that the Fourteenth Amendment does on state exercises of power. See Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is
the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment." (citations omitted)). Interestingly,
the plaintiff in Barrett mistakenly argued that the Lautenberg Amendment provisions vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment. The court chose to ignore this error and proceeded with
its analysis in accordance with the Fifth Amendment See National Ass'n of Gov't Employ-
ees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1572 n.10 (N.D. Ga. 1997), aff'd sub nom Hiley v. Barrett,
155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998).
187 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-13 to 16-14, at 1465-
74 (2d ed. 1988).
188 See id §§ 16-7 to 16-12, at 1454-65.
189 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
190 See TRBE, supra note 187, § 16-2, at 1440.
191 See id. § 16-6, at 1451.
192 See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a NewerEqual Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing strict scrutiny as
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact"). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (upholding forced internment ofJapanese Americans during World War II, despite
strict scrutiny triggered by race-based classification).
193 See TRIBE, supra note 187, § 16-2, at 1440.
194 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996) (using rational basis review to
strike down an amendment to a state constitution that withdrew legal protection from
homosexuals); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985)
(invalidating a zoning ordinance under rational basis review that targeted a group home
for the mentally retarded); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-36
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The cases discussed above reviewed the provisions of the
Lautenberg Amendment under the rational basis test. Except for FOP
, the provisions passed constitutional muster under this lenient test.
This section will discuss whether the courts applied the appropriate
standard, and if so, whether the Lautenberg Amendment provisions
should have survived rational basis review.
1. Is There a Fundamental Right to Bear Arms that Triggers Strict
Scrutiny?
The Second Amendment provides that "[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.' 95 The scope and
meaning of this amendment has been vehemently debated among
constitutional scholars. 196 There are two camps in this debate. Some
scholars argue that the Second Amendment guarantees a private, indi-
vidual right to bear arms and restricts the federal government's ability
to regulate guns. 19 7 Other scholars, however, maintain that the Sec-
ond Amendment is concerned only with the protection of state mili-
tias;198 therefore, the Second Amendment allows states and the
federal government to freely regulate private usage of firearms. 199
Despite these competing theoretical viewpoints among scholars,
nearly all federal and state courts agree that the Second Amendment
does not guarantee an individual private right to bear arms, unrelated
(1973) (applying rational basis review to invalidate a provision of the Food Stamp Act that
was designed to preclude hippie communes).
195 U.S. CoNST. amend. II.
196 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 895 (3d ed. 2000) ("Whether
the Second Amendment might restrain various forms of gun control is a topic that has
attracted much academic and popular, if not judicial, attention.").
197 See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY IAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 8-9 (1984); JOYCE LEE MALcoM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARms: THE
ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 161-64 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as
a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1162-64 (1991); Michelle Capezza, Comment, Controlling
Guns: A Call for Consistency inJudicial Review of Challenges to Gun Control Legislation, 25 SETON
HAL L. REv. 1467, 1471-78 (1995); Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Lin-
guistic Analysis of the Right to "BearArms, "LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 151, 162;
Don B. Kates,Jr., Gun Controk Separating Reality from Symbolism, 20J. CoNTEmP. L. 353, 359-
65 (1994); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204 (1983); Sanford Levinson, Comment, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 643-45 (1989).
198 See Levinson, supra note 197, at 644.
199 See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1365, 1387-88
(1993); Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On San-
ford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661, 665 (1989); Keith
A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You
Seen Your Militia Lately ?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 5, 57 (1989); David C. Williams, Civic Republi-
canism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendmen 101 YALE LJ. 551, 614 (1991).
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to a state's right to maintain a militia.200 In reaching this consensus,
lower courts have essentially followed the Supreme Court's 1939 rul-
ing and reasoning in United States v. Miller,201 the only Supreme Court
case that substantially grappled with the fundamental nature of the
Second Amendment.
In Miller, the Court ruled on the constitutionality of the National
Firearms Act of 1934 ("Firearms Ace') °202 It held that the Second
Amendment did not bar prosecution under the Firearms Act 203 In
this case, the plaintiff Miller was indicted under the Firearms Act for
the interstate transport of an unregistered, sawed-off shotgun.20 4 The
Court wrote:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or
use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in
length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preser-
vation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument.20 5
The Court required a strong evidentiary connection between the
weapon regulation and the preservation of a militia. Without such a
connection, the Court refused to extend the protection of the Second
Amendment.
The issue of whether firearm regulations trigger strict scrutiny for
equal protection purposes also has been settled. In Lewis v. United
States,20 6 the Supreme Court, citing Miller, held that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms does not trigger a strict scrutiny analy-
sis. 20 7 In this case, the issue was whether a statute prohibiting felons
200 See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 199, at 40 ("Indeed, the proposition that the
second amendment does not guarantee each individual a right to keep and bear arms for
private, non-militia purposes may be the most firmly established proposition in American
constitutional law.").
201 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
202 Act ofJune 26, 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (amended 1968). The Firearms Act was
the first federal statute regulating possession or use of firearms. See Brendon J. Healey,
Plugging the Bullet Holes in U.S. Gun Law: Ammunition-Based Proposal for Tightening Gun Con-
trol 32J. MASHALL L. REV. 1, 9 (1999).
203 See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
204 See id. at 175.
205 Id. at 178.
206 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
207 See id. at 65-66 & n.8; see also United States v. Ransom, 515 F.2d 885, 891 (5th Cir.
1975) (stating that a federal statute that prohibits convicted felons from receiving possess-
ing, or transporting firearms in commerce is rational); United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d
1329, 1338-39 (6th Cir. 1973) (analyzing gun control legislation under rational basis test);
United States v. Day, 476 F.2d 562, 568 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Synnes, 438 F.2d
764,771 n.9 (8th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he right to bear arms is not the type of fundamental right
to which the 'compelling state interest' standard attaches."), vacated on other grounds, 404
U.S. 1009 (1972); United States v. Kames, 437 F.2d 284, 287 (9th Cir. 1971) ("[N]one are
engaged in conduct-possession of firearms-that should be fostered or protected, nor
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from owning firearms was unconstitutional if a felon's previous con-
viction was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to coun-
sel.208 The Court refused to apply strict scrutiny, because "legislative
restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitu-
tionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally
protected liberties."20 9
The District of Columbia Circuit in FOP I labeled the nature of
the Second Amendment guarantee as "intriguing."210 In FOP 1, the
court suggested the possibility that the Miller test might be inapplica-
ble.21 1 Despite these statements, Miller and Lewis resolved the Second
Amendment debate on the correct standard to invoke for an equal
protection analysis. Therefore, current federal court review of the
Lautenberg Amendment provisions under the rational basis test is an
appropriate choice.
2. Should the Lautenberg Amendment Fail Rational Basis Review?
Although the question of which standard of review the Amend-
ment should be held to has been settled, the inquiry into the constitu-
tionality of the Lautenberg Amendment provisions is not complete.
The question remains whether the Amendment should withstand the
lenient rational basis test. As previously discussed, FOP Iheld that the
Amendment should not withstand rational basis review, while FOP II
and Barrett concluded the opposite. 21 2 In reaching these determina-
tions, the courts used different classification schemes. Unlike Barrett,
the District of Columbia Circuit in FOP I and FOP 1 described the
Lautenberg Amendment as distinguishing police officers convicted of
domestic violence felonies from police officers convicted of domestic
violence misdemeanors. 21 3 Under this classification scheme, the
are the rights at issue of the type that could not be constitutionally regulated by any statute,
nor is the interest here similar to any of those that are presently considered basic." (foot-
note omitted)).
208 See Lewis, 445 U.S. at 56.
209 Id. at 65 n.8.
210 Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1002 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g
granted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), reu'd on reh'g, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1999) (No. 99-106).
211 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 906 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1999) (No. 99-106) ("Since Mi/ler dealt with Con-
gress's authority to prohibit ownership of short-barreled shotguns, FOP could have chal-
lenged the test's applicability by arguing that it serves only to separate weapons covered by
the amendment from uncovered weapons. It did not do so, and we thus assume the test's
applicability.").
212 See supra Part II.B.
213 See Fraternal Order of Police, 173 F.3d at 901-04 (focusing on the felon-misdemeanant
distinction); Fraternal Order of Police, 152 F.3d at 1002 ("[The amendment] thus allows the
states to arm police officers convicted of violent felonies, and even crimes of domestic
violence so long as those crimes are felonies, while withholding this privilege with respect to
domestic violence misdemeanors.").
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Lautenberg Amendment appears more troubling than what Barrett's
classification scheme-distinguishing domestic violence misdemean-
ants from other kinds of misdemeanants-would suggest. This com-
parison is, however, misleading and factually vacuous. Neither the
police nor the military will generally hire someone with a felony con-
viction. Therefore, the argument is inapplicable. The District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in FOP 11 recognized this logic, but failed to carefully
articulate the constitutional ramifications of this observation. 214 Thus,
it is necessary to elaborate on this observation and its implications.
Under traditional rational basis review, statutory classifications
are presumptively constitutional. 215 The validity of a law depends only
on the court's ability to conceive of a "state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the classification."21 6 Furthermore, it is constitu-
tionally permissible for a legislature to approach a problem "one step
at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind."217
One need look no further than Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma,218 one of the pivotal cases in this area, to realize that the
Lautenberg Amendment provisions should survive rational basis re-
view. In Williamson, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that effec-
tively prohibited opticians from fitting lenses without a prescription
from an ophthalmologist. 219 One of the challenges against the statute
was its exemption of sellers of ready-to-wear glasses, while inexplicably
including opticians within its provisions. 220 Despite the seeming irra-
tionality of the statute's underinclusiveness, the Court upheld the va-
lidity of the legislation. In support of its position, the Court wrote that
"[tihe prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further
than the invidious discrimination."22 1 Because invidious discrimina-
tion did not drive the exemption, the Court was unconcerned with
the state legislature's motivation for selectively excluding sellers of
ready-to-wear glasses. The Court noted, "For all this record shows, the
ready-to-wear branch of this business may not loom large in
Oklahoma or may present problems of regulation distinct from the
other branch."222 Thus, although inclusion of sellers of ready-to-wear
glasses rather than opticians within the statutory schema was a logical
214 See Fraternal Order of Police, 173 F.3d at 903-04 (alluding to the nonlegal restrictions
preventing felons from acquiring firearms).
215 See, e.g., Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 370 (1988).
216 FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
217 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
218 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
219 See id. at 484-88.
220 See id. at 488-89.
221 Id at 489.
222 Id.
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alternative, the Court hypothesized that there may simply not be
enough of them doing business in the state to pose a problem worth
regulating.
Similarly, the Lautenberg Amendment provisions satisfy the com-
ponents of rational basis review because there is no evidence of dis-
criminatory intent. As evidenced by the congressional debate over the
Amendment, Congress did not intend to discriminate against police
officers who commit domestic violence misdemeanors. Rather, Con-
gress's motivation in removing the public-interest exception for do-
mestic violence misdemeanants-permissible under the rational basis
standard-conceivably came from the high incidence of domestic vio-
lence assaults prosecuted as misdemeanors. In other words, Congress
focused on the most prevalent area of domestic violence: crimes classi-
fied as misdemeanors.
More significantly, however, Williamson's reasoning suggests that
the FOP Ischema-police officers convicted of domestic violence mis-
demeanors versus police officers convicted of domestic violence felo-
nies-is a red herring. Examining the reasoning of Williamson
prompts the following question: Does the problem of police officers
who commit domestic violence felonies "loom large" in the United
States? 223 Most likely, the answer is no. It is unlikely that the police or
the military will hire someone with a felony conviction, including a
domestic violence felony.224 This concern, presumably, is the "formal
and informal hiring practices '225 that the FOP II court mentioned
when justifying the reversal of its original decision.
However, the same is not true regarding the hiring practices of
the police and the military with respect to those convicted of domestic
violence misdemeanors. The majority of domestic violence charges
and prosecutions are misdemeanors, but the police and the military
only screen those with felony convictions. Given this situation, it is
reasonable that Congress recognized the danger of armed police and
military personnel with domestic violence misdemeanor convictions.
Congress merely filled a gap by blocking those with domestic violence
misdemeanor convictions in these areas of employment from access to
guns as was already policy for domestic violence felonies. The cate-
223 Id.
224 See, e.g., Teodorski Testimony, supra note 133 ("Departments do not ... hire or retain
any officer who has a history of domestic abuse.... What the new law does is unfairly
penalizes good officers who made a single mistake, paid the cost of that mistake, and went
on with their lives."); see also Kerri Fredheim, Comment, Closing the Loopholes in Domestic
Violence Laws: The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (g)(9), 19 PACE L. REv. 445, 499 (1999)
(reporting that the United States Department ofJustice, the New York City Police Depart-
ment, and the Los Angeles Police Department have a policy of automatic discharge of any
officer who is convicted of any felony).
225 Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 173 F.3d 898, 904 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
68 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1999) (No. 99-106).
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gory of police officers convicted of domestic violence felonies, which
was referenced by the FOP I court in striking down the elimination of
the public interest exception by the Lautenberg Amendment, does
not create an equal protection problem because the class is signifi-
candy small.
The Lautenberg Amendment's statutory scheme is rational for
still another reason: it fulfills an additional gap-filling role. Most
states have laws barring felons from possessing firearms.226 However,
only New York provides for a government-interest exemption for po-
lice and military personnel, regardless of their felony convictions. 227
While nearly all states bar felons from gun ownership, most do not
completely bar domestic violence misdemeanants from owning fire-
arms.2 28 By enacting the Lautenberg Amendment, Congress filled
this gap.
FOP I relied on a deceptive schema and deviated from the tradi-
tional permissiveness of rational basis review by striking down the do-
mestic violence provisions of the Lautenberg Amendment. Although,
the appellate court remedied the situation in FOP II, its exploration of
the appropriate rational basis analysis was insufficient. A more thor-
ough analysis of the inclusion of police and military personnel within
the Lautenberg Amendment is necessary.
B. Eliminating the Public Interest Exception: A Policy Argument
As the numerous challenges to the Lautenberg Amendment
demonstrate, the Amendment is under legislative and judicial scru-
tiny. A particular concern is that a court finding the felon-misde-
meanant anomaly sufficiently troubling may strike the Lautenberg
Amendment in its entirety, thereby eliminating the protections given
to domestic assault victims through gun control.229 Regardless of how
reviewing courts resolve the constitutional issue, a fundamental ques-
tion remains: Purely from a policy perspective, should the police and
the military be included under the purview of a gun ban that disarms
domestic assailants? In order to appropriately answer this question, it
is necessary to explore the policy arguments suggesting a general
need for a domestic violence gun ban. Advocates of tough domestic
violence law argue that several factors-recidivism, escalation of vio-
lence, increased danger of attacks involving firearms, and prosecution
226 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g
granted, 159 F.3d 1362 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), rev'd on reh'g, 173 F.3d 898 (D.C.
Cr.), cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 1999) (No. 99-106).
227 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20(a) (1) (McKinney 1989).
228 For a survey of state gun control and domestic violence laws, see supra Part IA.
229 See Note, supra note 178, at 1030 ("By far the most common fate of statutes contain-
ing unconstitutional exceptions is complete destruction.").
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of domestic violence as a misdemeanor-make the Lautenberg
Amendment a necessary tool to combat domestic violence.230
Domestic violence assault, rarely an isolated incident, is a crime
of high recidivism rates, characterized by escalation of verbal and
physical abuse over time. 231 As this violence escalates, the likelihood
that the violent incidents will involve the use of a weapon also in-
creases.2 32 An estimated one in ten domestic violence incidents in-
volves a gun.23 3 Although guns are not the only weapons used in
domestic violence, those assaults involving guns are twelve times more
likely to result in death than all other domestic assaults.23 4 Because of
the high rate of recidivism and the rapid escalation of violence, prior
domestic assault convictions act as accurate predictors of which abus-
ers are at high risk of perpetrating domestic violence assaults using
weapons.235
Furthermore, the felony provisions of the GCA inadequately ad-
dress the issue of domestic violence. Many state statutes and prosecu-
tion practices classify domestic violence as a misdemeanor, even
though ninety percent of stranger assault cases with the same severity
of assault and resulting injury lead to a felony classification.23 6 As a
result of this discrepancy, the GCA prior to the Lautenberg Amend-
ment contained a loophole for domestic batterers. Senator Paul Well-
stone made this policy argument when speaking in support of the
Lautenberg Amendment on the floor of the Senate:
The problem.., is... if you beat up or batter your neighbor's
wife, it is a felony. If you beat up or batter, brutalize your own wife
or your own child, it is a misdemeanor.
If the offense is a misdemeanor, then under the current law
there is a huge loophole. We do not let people who have been con-
victed of a felony purchase that firearm. What the Senator from
230 See Edwards Testimony, supra note 130.
231 See BJS FINDINGs, supra note 6, at 2 (documenting that one in five victims of domes-
tic abuse reported three or more serious assaults within a six-month period); see also Ed-
wards Testimony, supra note 130 ("[D]omestic violence is a crime which is often
characterized by a pattern of abusive behavior, verbal and physical, which escalates in fre-
quency and severity over time. Recidivism rates for domestic violence are extraordinarily
high.").
232 See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Wo-
men: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 Hos'rTA L. REv. 801, 1155 (1993) (cita-
tions omitted).
233 See PATSY A. KLAUS & MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DErT. OF JUSTICE, BuREAu OFJusCE
STATS., SPECIAL REPORT: FAMILY VIoLENCE (1984).
234 See Edwards Testimony, supra note 130 (citing L.E. Saltzman et al., Weapon Involvement
and Injury Outcomes in Family and Intimate Assaults, 267JAMA 22 (1992)).
235 In 1994, 28% of all women murdered were killed by their husbands or boyfriends.
See Edwards Testimony, supra note 130.
236 See Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State of the Law, 28 Ca4UN,-
HOUSE RaV. 383, 386-87 (1994) (citation omitted).
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New Jersey is trying to do is plug this loophole and prohibit some-
one convicted of domestic abuse, whether felony or misdemeanor,
[from] purchasing a firearm.23 7
Thus, Congress viewed the Lautenberg Amendment as a necessary
and natural extension of the GCA that insures weapon disqualification
whether or not the assault occurs within or outside of the context of
domestic violence.
Given the general policy arguments underlying the Lautenberg
Amendment, should a gun ban that disarms domestic assailants in-
clude police and military personnel? A comparison of the following
two passages of congressional testimony illuminates the debate. The
first is a statement by the National Vice President of the Grand Lodge
of the Fraternal Order of Police. The second, describing a separate
and unrelated domestic violence incident, is by the Executive Director
of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence:
Lieutenant Dale Barsness of the Minneapolis, Minnesota Police
Department pled guilty in 1991 to a fifth degree domestic assault
against his wife. Lieutenant Barsness, head of the department's
homicide unit, was forced to give up his firearm in December, as
were three other officers in that department, two of them who had
over 20 years of experience on the force a single blemish on their
record. 238
Mary's husband, a law enforcement investigator, held two guns
to her head, to "demonstrate" how a man accused of killing his wife
had done it. He foiled her attempts to get help by listening to her
calls on the police scanner. Her restraining order allowed him to
keep his gun. Finally arrested a few weeks ago, the paperwork at
[his] arraignment mistakenly had someone else's name on it, and
was thrown out. She wonders if his friends are engineering the
paperwork problems.23 9
These passages capture the essence of the debate surrounding
the Lautenberg Amendment as it pertains to the removal of the public
interest exception from the domestic violence misdemeanor provi-
sions. Police and military members argue that the gun control provi-
sions should exclude them because enforcement will result in the
firing or dismissal of a substantial number of officers and soldiers.
However, according to advocates of the Lautenberg Amendment, this
argument merely suggests that a large number of police and military
are committing acts of domestic violence.
237 142 CONG. REc. S10,379 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
See also id. at S10,380 (daily ed Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
238 Teodorshi Testimony, supra note 133.
239 Smith Testimony, supra note 129. During her testimony, Smith condemned the Re-
publican "majority... [which] prevented battered women from personally testifying [at
this hearing] about the impact of the Barr and Stupak proposals." Id.
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Several well-documented factors suggest that the Lautenberg
Amendment should include the police and the military within the gun
ban provisions. First, members of the police and the military have a
high incidence of domestic violence. One study on domestic violence
in police families concluded that forty-one percent of police officers
admitted to using physical violence during marital conflicts. 240 This
rate is significantly higher than that of a random sample of the
nonpolice population.2 41 Similar findings in the military estimate that
the incidence of domestic violence is as much as five times higher in
the armed forces than in the civilian population.2 42 Additionally,
members of the military are often involved in domestic abuse that is
more violent, more likely to involve lethal force, and more likely to
involve the use of a weapon than that perpetrated by civilians.2 43 Easy
access to guns in the military has led to fatalities in domestic violence
incidents, as illustrated by the recent example of three women killed
by their intimates within a two-year period on a single army base in
Kentucky. 244 Since the perpetrators in the police and the military use
guns to commit domestic violence at a higher rate than those among
the general public, the exclusion of the police and the military from
the Lautenberg Amendment would seriously undermine its efficacy.
Second, the perpetrator's membership in the police or the mili-
tary leads to high rate of underreporting of the domestic assaults,
which is already common in the civilian context.2 45 Women battered
240 See Edwards Testimony, supra note 130 (citing P. Neidig et al., Interspousal Aggression
in Law Enforcement Families: A Preliminary Investigation, 15 POLcE STUD. 30-38 (1992));
Lonald D. Lott, Deadly Secrets: Violence in the Police Family, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BuLL., Nov.
1, 1995, at 12, available in 1995 WL 15080114 ("[P]olice officers [are] more prone than
average citizens to alcoholism, domestic violence, divorce, and suicide."); see Rivera Live:
How Police Officers Handle Domestic Violence Caused at the Hands of Fellow Officers, (CNBC tele-
vision broadcast, Aug. 1, 1997), available in 1997 WL 12600310 [hereinafter Rivera Live]
(stating that an LAPD study of domestic violence involving police "revealed an old boys
network in which officers repeatedly got away with domestic violence, which simply was not
treated seriously"); see also Hampton Testimony, supra note 131 (" [P] olicing has the highest
proportion of batteries of all U.S. occupations.").
241 See Edwards Testimony, supra note 130.
242 See 60 Minutes: The War at Home (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 17, 1999), available
in 1999 WL 6014509 [hereinafter The War at Home] (reporting that domestic violence by
military men is not adequately addressed by the military).
243 SeeJoan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications of New
Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 929, 983 (1994) ("Soldiers are more
often violent and are more likely to use lethal force against their wives than are civilian
men. Soldiers are also more likely to use weapons against their female partners than are
civilians.").
244 See The War at Home, supra note 242.
245 See Zorza, supra note 243, at 982 ("Battered women's advocates report that military
wives, and especially those of officers, are considerably fearful of reporting domestic vio-
lence or recurrences of such violence, believing that it would seriously [a]ffect their hus-
band's career."); Smith Testimony, supra note 129 (discussing underreporting in the police
context); Rivera Live, supra note 240.
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by members of the police or the military who seek outside interven-
tion must request help from the batterers' coworkers, friends, col-
leagues, or superiors. The difficulty of overcoming this obstacle
suggests the seriousness of the domestic violence crimes that are
reported.
A third, interrelated factor involves the so-called "code of si-
lence,"2 46 by which members of the police ignore and cover-up law
violations by other fellow officers-an occurrence that seems particu-
larly likely in the context of domestic violence.2 47 The "code of si-
lence" further deters women abused by members of the police or the
military from reporting assaults.2 48 When victims do bring charges,
prosecutors with strong personal connections to the batterer and his
police department often undermine the cases and do not pursue de-
partmental punishments. 249 The difficulty of overcoming these signif-
icant obstacles by the victims *of domestic assaults perpetrated by the
members of the police and the military points to the seriousness and
severity of the assaults that lead to misdemeanor convictions.
These factors suggest that the policy considerations underlying
the Lautenberg Amendment extend equally well, if not more convinc-
ingly, to members of the police and the military who commit acts of
domestic violence. Thus, Congress should remedy the felon-misde-
meanant anomaly, which poses a risk to the Amendment by leaving it
ripe for continued constitutional challenge, by eliminating the public-
interest exception for all instances of domestic violence. Congress
should make it explicit that no member of the police or the military
who is convicted of any act of domestic violence-felony or misde-
meanor-shall be permitted to have access to firearms.
246 Lott, supra note 240.
247 See id.
248 See Edwards Testimony, supra note 130 ("The code of silence among officers makes
victims reluctant to come forward.").
249 See Smith Testimony, supra note 129. A television commentator reported anecdotes
revealed by a Los Angeles Police Department report on this issue:
One police officer received a 15-day suspension for slapping his wife and
then threatened to commit suicide and was described in an evaluation as a
quote, "problem free employee," end quote. Another officer who raped his
girlfriend only received an official reprimand. Later that year, the officer
sexually abused a woman with a handgun and received another reprimand.
He was neither arrested nor criminally charged in either incident... And
perhaps the most outrageous example involves an officer who had been
drinking in a bar with his wife, then was involved in a hit-and-run accident.
After the crash, the officer struck his wife and broke her nose. Despite the
crimes of public drunkenness, assualt, fleeing the scene of an accident and
failure to have his car insured the officer's punishment was a 10-day
suspension.
Rivera Live, supra note 240.
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CONCLUSION
The Lautenberg Amendment recognizes that domestic violence
usually involves recurring and escalating acts of violence that will
more likely result in murder if the abuser has access to firearms. It
further recognizes that despite the severity of the physical assault, do-
mestic violence is most often charged and prosecuted as a misde-
meanor crime.
Nonetheless, the current law under the Lautenberg Amendment,
which courts should continue to review under a rational basis analysis,
is seriously flawed. Although there are arguments to show that the
Amendment as it is should survive equal protection's most lenient
scrutiny, as a policy matter Congress is seriously undermining its own
objectives by allowing the felon-misdemeanant anomaly to stand. The
law is open for continuing challenge and thus it risks the possibility
that a court might ultimately resolve the felon-misdemeanant anomaly
by striking the law in its entirety.
The firearms ban following any domestic violence conviction
should include police and military members. As the executive direc-
tor of a national police organization argued before the House Sub-
committee on Crime, not only are police and military statistically
more likely to perpetrate acts of domestic violence than the civilian
population, these acts are likely more violent and more likely to in-
volve the use of weapons.2 50 Given these realities, excluding the po-
lice and the military is irrational and ultimately undermines the
efficacy of the Lautenberg Amendment. Congress should clarify the
necessity of including the police and the military within the Amend-
ment's provision by explicitly stating that there will be no public-inter-
est exception for domestic violence convictions of any kind,
misdemeanor or felony. To act differently would eviscerate an impor-
tant piece of legislation with the potential to save the lives of individu-
als who would otherwise have to take their chances with armed
abusers.
250 See Hampton Testimony, supra note 131.
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